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Abstract 
The aim for this paper is to examine the impact of life-cycle attributes of firms on conservatism. This timely loss 
recognition attribute of earnings has been proven theoretically and empirically to benefit users of accounting information 
by addressing moral hazards in the economy, and constraining managerial opportunistic behaviour caused by asymmetric 
information.  Using data from 1995 to 2010, the findings show that impacts of conservatism level using Khan and Watts 
(2009)’s C_score measure differ significantly through-out the life-cycle stages of firms.  
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1. Introduction 
Life-cycle stages can be defined as distinct and identifiable phases that arise from changes in internal 
factors such as strategy choices, financial resources and managerial ability, and/or external factors such as 
competitive environment and macroeconomic factors (Dickinson, 2011). Black (1998) defines life-cycle 
stages as a surrogate for firms’ economic attributes. A review of the literature suggests that firm life-cycle is 
an important determinant of many corporate decisions (Quinn and Cameron, 1983; Smith, Mitchell, and 
Summer, 1985; Lester and Parnell, 1999; Lester, Parnell, Crandall, and Menefee, 2008). As organizational 
behavior differs in different life-cycle stage, the financial reporting behavior is also expected to vary with 
stages of organizational life-cycle. In fact, researchers are of the view that corporate life-cycle reflects the 
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result of dynamic accounting choice which resembles factors beyond earnings management motivations since 
it is hardly believed that all managers would share the same motivation and incentives at the same time during 
different life-cycle stages(Chen, Yang, and Huang, 2010). This study would examine the impact of life-cycle 
hypothesis on earnings quality, namely conservatism. 
 
2. Literature Review, Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Formulation 
2.1. Conservatism 
Conservatism is commonly defined as timely loss recognition or asymmetric timeliness of earnings2 which 
reflects higher degree of verification requirements for gains than for losses (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003). In 
simpler words, asymmetric timeliness of earnings means the speediness in writing up net assets upon 
receiving good news is not as quick as writing down the net assets upon receiving correspondingly sufficient 
bad news (Ryan, 2006). Conservatism was initially known at its extreme form as ‘anticipate no profit, but 
anticipate all losses’ (Watts 2003; Guay and Verrecchia, 2006) which means that there is differential 
verification of gains versus losses. Conservatism lies on the notion that the persistent understatement of nett 
asset values as the main effect of this asymmetric verifiability of gains over losses should be maintained to 
avoid significant costs and moral hazard to investors and the economy as a whole. 
Conservatism has been theoretically and empirically found to give benefits to users of financial statements. 
It is also considered as a desirable characteristic that ensures high quality of financial reporting although the 
removal of conservatism from the conceptual framework by the accounting standards setters recently attracts 
opposing views from academics and practioners (FASB, 1980; Smith, Smith, and Burrowes, 2013). 
Opponents to conservatism argue that conservatism biases the nett assets and earnings downwards, thus 
introducing higher information asymmetry that it would otherwise meant to and lead users to make incorrect 
judgements. This causes inefficient resource allocations and reduction in firm value up to the extent that firms 
may reject positive NPV projects (Penman and Zhang, 2002; Guay and Verrecchia, 2006). Counter arguments 
by proponents of conservatism (Watts, 2003; Qiang, 2007; Givoly and Hayn, 2000) state that the benefits of 
asymmetric loss recognition such as avoiding negative NPV projects outweigh the costs of forgoing gains 
such as positive NPV projects. The avoidance of bad outcomes from non-conservative treatment which may 
lead to excessive dividends distribution, for instance, is more beneficial than forgoing gains due to 
conservative treatment that would result in, for example, firms retaining unnecessary capital. In addition, 
empirical evidence on the benefits of conservatism found until today cannot undermine the usefulness of 
conservatism (Hu, Li, and Zhang, 2014; Lim, Lee, Kausar, and Walker, 2014). 
 
2.2. Conservatism and life-cycle hypothesis 
Life-cycle research in effect, is much thorough and comprehensive in reflecting firms’ innate factors and in 
charting the progress of business fundamentals of firms compared to research of business fundamentals in 
portions or segments. Previous studies have documented that measures of earnings quality (including 
conservatism) do have their associations with business fundamentals, strategies and financial resources which 
make up the basis of the life-cycle stages (Chen, Yang and Huang, 2010; Chen, Chang, and Fu, 2010; Liu, 
2008). Despite the importance of life-cycle research, there are limited publications examining the life-cycle 
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theory (inclusive of all stages, instead of only growth and mature) and conservatism. A search of the literature 
found only a single published paper that examines the life-cycle theory and conservatism measure. However, 
this study by Park and Chen (2006) does not assess directly the life-cycle hypothesis with conservatism 
measure but assesses the joint effects of life-cycle stage and conservatism on value relevance of financial 
information using the Feltham and Ohlson (1995)’s model. Within this model, there is a measure of firms’ 
accounting conservatism which becomes a factor of firm valuations. 
A study looking at only growth and mature stages is done by Charitou, Lambertides, and Trigeorgis 
(2011). They reveal that earnings quality of US firms from 1990 to 2004, measured by the timeliness of 
earnings (conservatism) and the management of earnings towards positive targets, differs between growth 
firms and value (mature) firms as well as among firms in financial distress, firms filed for bankruptcy and 
healthy firms.  Although the stages of firms are not captured under the life-cycle theme, the study shows that 
growth firms (firms with high growth prospects) have greater earnings timeliness for bad news than value 
firms (firms with low growth option) which contradict the previous studies (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 
1995; McNichols, 2000; Lee, Li, and Yue, 2006). It is suggested that market can accept losses incurred by 
growth firms and does not overreact to loss occurrence. Charitou et al. (2011) also found that growth firms are 
more conservative when it comes to good news while concluding that value firms exhibit lower timeliness for 
both good and bad news compared with growth firms as they have higher ability to use unusual strategies 
either to delay positive earnings or to reduce impact of negative earnings in order to secure their reputations as 
established firms in the market. Charitou et al. (2011) also show that distressed firms exhibit greater earnings 
timeliness for good news and lower earnings timeliness for bad news than healthy firms. 
The same thoughts are not shared by McNichols (2000) who argues that firms with higher expected 
earnings growth exhibit higher than expected accruals (which indicates poor earnings quality and also lower 
conservatism level) compared to firms with lower expected earnings growth. Similarly, Lee et al. (2006) 
argues that firms with higher performance and growth over-report earnings by a larger amount (an indication 
of low earnings quality and lower conservatism level) because price responsiveness increases with earnings 
performance and growth. 
In an unpublished paper by Chen and Huang (2007)3, accounting conservatism for firms in the start-up and 
growth stages is suggested to be inclined towards unconditional conservatism practice and less of the 
conditional conservatism. This is done to smooth income. When firms approach declining stage, conditional 
conservatism becomes stronger to stop the growth-dependent biases caused by unconditional conservatism in 
the future periods. The total conservatism displays systematic variation over the firm’s life-cycle, with a U 
shape relationship. 
Based on Charitou et al. (2011), it is posited that growth firms tend to be more conservative (for both bad 
news and good news) as they have higher ability to show losses compared to mature firms as market may not 
overreact to losses generated by growth firms and that growth firms are not likely to postpone positive 
earnings. For declining firms (in this case, declining firms are presumed to be firms in distress), it is posited 
that they are less conservative than firms in other stages. As these are in accordance with the signalling theory 
and the opportunistic behaviour explanation, this study would therefore shed some lights on the issues which 
are rarely dealt with in prior literature by examining the impact of life-cycle stages on firms’ level of 
conservatism to bad news (the C_score).  The hypotheses are as follows: 
 
H1: Growth firms are more likely to exhibit higher conservatism (to bad news) than mature firms; 
H2: Declining firms are more likely to exhibit lower conservatism (to bad news) than mature firms; 
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In this study, the stages of firms’ life-cycle would be seperated into three groups (growth, mature and decline 
stages). Life-cycle measurements used follow those from Anthony and Ramesh (1992) procedures.  
3. Research Design 
Khan and Watts (2009) refines Basu (1997)’s model by introducing a firm-year conservatism measure 
known as C_score. It is an advancement of Basu model in that it overcomes Basu’s model limitation where 
Basu model is estimated either for an industry-year conservatism using cross-section of firms in the industry 
or for a firmusing  time-series of firm years. Prior researches have demanded a firm-level measure of 
conservatism to address the issue of factors affecting firm-year conservatism (Ryan, 2006). Hence, the use of 
C_score is appropriate in examining the impact of life-cycle stages examined in this study. 
The firm-specific factors are added on to the original Basu model above (Equation 1) to generate annual 
cross-sectional coefficients that takes into account firm characteristics. Conservatism is explained by four 
factors; contracts, litigation, taxation and regulation (Watts, 2003). According to Khan and Watts (2009), 
these four factors vary with the firm’s investment opportunity sets (IOS) and that the variables added onto 
Basu (1997)’s model are proxies commonly used for IOS. The variations of the chosen proxies for IOS, 
namely size of firm, market-to-book ratio and firm’s level of leverage, in turn, represent the variations in 
firm’s conservatism. 
As the first step in computing the C_score, the following modified Basu model is regressed annually for 
each year from 1995 to 2010 to generate the empirical estimators of µi and λi (i = 1 – 4). Both of these 
coefficients are constant across firms, but vary overtime since they are estimated from annual cross-sectional 
regressions. 
 

                        
              
(1) 
 
where, for firm i: 
 = income before extraordinary items; 
 = market value of equity at beginning of year; 
 = annual stock returns compounded from monthly returns beginning from the fifth month  
                                after the end of the fiscal year; 
 = dummy variable, one if R ≤ 0 , and zero otherwise; 
 = natural log of market value of equity; 
 = market-to-book ratio; 
 = long-term and short-term debt, scaled by beginning-of-year market value of equity; 
 = error term; 
 
Secondly, the estimators µ1 and λi (i = 1 – 4) from Equation 1 are then substituted in Equation 2 and 3 
below (variables as defined earlier) to estimate the C_score and G-score. C_score is the firm-year measure of 
conservatism indicating incremental bad news timeliness. The G_score is the good news timeliness. Adding 
them together produces total bad news timeliness at an individual firm-level. From the equations, both scores 
are considered linear functions of firm-specific characteristics which were described earlier as explaining the 
variations in firm-year conservatism level. 
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(2) 
           
(3) 
 
Finally, the computed C_score is then regressed against variables of interests in the study as a mean to 
examine the impact of life-cycle stage on firm-year conservatism. The groupings of firms into their life-cycle 
stages follow Anthony and Ramesh (1992) based on growth, capital expenditure, dividend and firm age (see 
Table1). The volatility and investment cycle are control variables found to be significant in C_score 
measurements (Khan and Watts, 2009; Chi, Liu, and Wang, 2009) while the audit report and auditor type are 
common control variables in studies of earnings quality  (Charitou, et al., 2011; Chi, et al., 2009). 
 
                 
(4) 
where: 
 
C_score = the firm-year measure of conservatism, estimated by Equation 1; 
Lcg = dummy variable, one if growth/mature/decline stage, and zero otherwise; 
Vol = volatility, the standard deviation of daily firm-level stock returns in acalendar year  
Invc = investment cycle, depreciation expense deflated by lagged assets  
Art = dummy variable, one if qualified audit report (Audit Report in Annual Reports), and zero  
                           otherwise; 
Aut = dummy variable, one if auditor is Big4 (Audit Report in Annual Reports), and zero otherwise; 
 
Analysis is done using panel data regression. The sample is taken from all public listed companies on the 
Main Board and Second Board of Bursa Malaysia, after excluding banks, financial institutions, and real estate 
companies. The sample years are from 1995 to 2010. Overall, the final sample is 9,440 firm-year 
observations.  
 
          Table1. Determinants of life-cycle stages 
 
Life-cycle 
determinants Definition 
Growth  
  
  
SGt:          Percent sales growth in year t 
Salest,t-1:   Net sales in year t, year t-1  
Capital expenditure 
  

  
CEVt:       Capital expenditure as a percentage of total value of thefirm in year t 
CEt:          Capital expenditure in year t 
VALUEt:  Market value of equity plus book value of long- term debt at the end of the year t 
Dividend payment 
 
 

  
DPt:        Annual dividend as a percentage of income in year t 
DIVt:       Common dividends in year t 
IBED:     Income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations in year t 
Age Difference between the current year and the year in which the business was originally formed. 
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4. Results and Discussions 
Table 2 shows that out of 9,440 total observations with life-cycle stages, 74.6% or 7,041 firm years lies in 
the mature stage. This is in line with the expectation that companies listed on Bursa Malaysia are well-
established companies that are required that have certain level of performance and profitability before being 
accepted to be listed on the stock exchange. This number is followed by the declining firm years with 15.2% 
or 1,435 observations and 10.2% or 964 observations for firm years in growth stages during the 16-year 
period of 1995 to 2010. From individual years’ perspective (untabulated results), companies in growth stage 
increase rapidly from year 2001 until 2005, the period of recovery after a bad financial crisis in 1997 and 
1998. This trend is also apparent for the companies in mature stages which increases suddenly in 2001 and 
this trend persisted until 2010. The doublefold of the number of observations for declining firm years in the 
year 2005 could points out to the intense business competition, more stringent Bursa Malaysia listing 
requirements, and thereby, a better financial reporting quality around these years. 
 
   Table 2. Sample description according to life-cycle stages 
 
Panel A: Distribution of sample firm years into life-cycle stage (Classification using Anthony and Ramesh 1992 procedures) during 
the period of 1995 to 2010  
Life-cycle stage Code No of observations % 
Growth 1 964 10.2 
Mature 3 7,041 74.6 
Decline 5 1,435 15.2 
Total   9,440 100.0 
 
Table 3 below shows the mean coefficients from the annual cross-sectional (FamaMacBeth) regressions of 
earnings on variables as listed in Equation 1 as well as their t-statistics. The regression model is estimated 
annually to allow the coefficients to vary annually. The annual parameter estimates are then used to calculate 
C_score in Equation 2 and G-score in Equation 3. The positively significant coefficient for D x R indicates 
that in general, firms are conservative. This is in line with prior Malaysian study by Ho (2009) although it 
contradicts results by Khan and Watts (2009) (not significant with negative coefficient). Ho also finds that 
coefficient for R is negatively significant which contrasts findings of this study. This could be due to different 
samples taken which was only one fiscal year (2008). Other coefficients are relatively different from those of 
Khan and Watts (2009) possibly due to different market and economic conditions between developed 
countries like the US and developing countries like Malaysia.  
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Table 3. Mean coefficients from estimation regressions (Equation 1) using FamaMacBeth (1973) two-step procedure 
(Dependent variable is EARN) 
Independent Variable Predicted Sign Mean Coefficients t-statistics 
Intercept  -0.106 -1.28 
D  0.246 2.16^  
R  + -0.189 -0.56 
R x SIZE + -0.716 -1.38 
R x M2B - 0.078 1.00 
R x LEV - 0.309 1.64 
D x R  + 1.600 3.51* 
D x R x SIZE - -0.159 -0.28 
D x R x M2B + -0.134 -1.43 
D x R x LEV + -0.167 -0.87 
SIZE  0.214 3.92* 
M2B  -0.026 -1.20 
LEV  -0.073 -4.56* 
D x SIZE  -0.257 -3.13* 
D x M2B  0.035 1.11 
D x LEV  0.065 3.14* 
AverageRsq.  0.276  
Note: EARN is nett income before extraordinary items (Item WC01551 in Datastream) scaled by market value of 
equity at beginning of year (Item MV in Datastream); R is annual stock returns compounded from monthly returns 
beginning from the  fifth month after the end of the fiscal year (Item UP in Datastream);DR is dummy variable, one 
if R ≤ 0 , and zero otherwise; SIZE is natural  log of market value of equity (Item MV in Datastream); M2B is 
market-to-book ratio (Item PTBV in Datastream); LEV is long-term and short-term debt (Item WC03255 in 
Datastream), scaled by beginning-of-year market value of equity (Item MV in Datastream); n = 9440. */^ denotes 
significant level at 1%/5% respectively. 
 
Table 4 reports the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and median of the C_score and all 
other variables for the full sample throughout the years 1995 to 2010. The C_score measure of bad news 
timeliness in this study has a mean of 0.208 which is higher than those reported by Khan and Watts (2009) of 
the US firms (0.105 as shown in Table 4, page 138) and Chi et al. (2009) of Taiwanese firms (0.19 as shown 
in Table 1, page 52). The standard deviation of 2.271 is also greater than that of Khan and Watts (0.139) and 
Chi et al. (0.468). However, a study using Malaysian firms in 2008 by (Ho, 2009) reveals similar C_score 
mean of 0.223 and a standard deviation of 1.1168. In another study by (Abdul Rahman, 2012) of 1,621 
Malaysian firms from 2000 to 2007, the mean, median and standard deviation of the C_score are 0.49 and 
2.219 respectively, which are even higher than other studies. This could be due to different market and 
economic environment as mentioned earlier. 
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           Table 4. Descriptive statistics: panel data variables for conservatism, and life-cycle hypothesis 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Computation of C_scoreandG_score (Equation 1,2,3) 
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev Min Max Unit of measurement 
EARN (Earnings) -0.096 0.735 -9.953 0.690 Ratio MYR/ MYR (million) 
R (Return) -0.105 0.447 -2.125 1.813 Ratio MYR/MYR 
DR (Return Dummy) 0.568 0.495 0 1 Dichotomous 
SIZE 
(Market Value of 
Equity) 
2.166 0.678 0.122 4.346 Log of MYR(million) 
M2B (Market-to-Book Ratio) 1.278 1.971 -18.30 43.83 Ratio 
LEV (Leverage) 5.391 2.530 -1.513 10.575 
Log of 
(MYR/MYR(million)) 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Interested Variables (Equation 4) 
Variable Definition Mean Std.Dev Min Max Unit of measurement 
       
C_SCORE (Conservatism) 0.208 2.271 -16.214 25.778 Score 
G_SCORE (Conservatism) 0.144 2.189 -26.583 17.728 Score 
VOL (Volatility) 0.622 0.463 0 8.771 Sqrt of SD of MYR 
INVC (Investment Cycle) 0.033 0.117 -0.004 10.848 Ratio MYR/MYR 
LCG1 (Growth Stage) 0.102 0.303 0 1 Dichotomous 
LCG3 (Mature Stage) 0.746 0.435 0 1 Dichotomous 
LCG5 (Decline Stage) 0.152 0.359 0 1 Dichotomous 
ART (Audit Report Type) 0.083 0.303 0 2 Dichotomous 
AUT (Auditor Type) 0.625 0.484 0 1 Dichotomous 
 
For the measure of good news timeliness, the G_score shows a mean of 0.144 and a standard 
deviation of 2.189 which are different than those reported by Khan and Watts (0.048 and 0.055 respectively) 
that could result from similar explanation as for C_score above. Nevertheless, the lower G_score compared to 
C_score is in line with their study. It is noted that the mean for EARN is a negative figure of 0.096. This 
shows that EARN data is skewed to the left, consistent with Bushman and Piotroski (2006)and other prior 
studies, most likely due to its components of Net Income Before Extraordinary Items (NIBE) and Market 
Value of Equity (MVE) which are also skewed to the left (unreported result). Moreover, stock returns display 
greater volatility than accounting income, indicating that managers tend to smooth earnings. Similar result is 
observed for R which has a mean of -0.105. This is very much in contrast with the results of Khan and Watts 
(2009) (0.157 as shown in Table 1, page 137). The mean SIZE of 2.166, mean M2B of 1.278, mean LEV of 
5.391, and mean VOL of 0.622 (as compared to Khan and Watts’s mean SIZE of 4.765, mean M2B of 2.121, 
mean LEV of 0.764, and mean Vol of 0.031) show relatively semi-efficient and smaller sized Malaysian 
capital market, and high debt ratio of Malaysian firms.  
Table 5 below shows the random and fixed panel regression results of total sample firms for the 16 
year period. The LM-Breusch Pagan test reveals that random effect is preferred to pooled-OLS model. Next, 
the Hausman test shows that fixed effect model is preferred to random effect model. Thus, fixed effect 
estimation is done and results are shown in the second column.In the analysis, the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) method of 1.20 rules out the presence of multicollinearity in this estimation model. The Modified Wald 
test indicates significant presence of both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Therefore, the fixed effect 
robustness test is performed and it gives consistent and better results as presented in the third column. 
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Table 5. Empirical results for regressing C_score on independent variables (Equation 4) on total sample 
Dependent variable is C_score (n = 9940) 
Independent Variable 
Panel-Random Effects Panel-Fixed Effects Panel-Fixed Effects (Robust) 
Coefficients Prob. Coefficients Prob. Coefficients Prob. 
C 0.0351 0.646 -0.0828 0.327 -0.0828 0.224 
VOL 0.6750 0.000*** 0.6463 0.000*** 0.6463 0.000*** 
INVC 0.0615 0.757 0.0164 0.942 0.0164 0.780 
LCG1 (GROWTH) -0.0270 0.726 -0.1976 0.030*** -0.1976 0.005*** 
LCG5 (DECLINE) 0.1975 0.003*** 0.2339 0.005*** 0.2339 0.007*** 
ART 0.3150 0.000*** 0.3787 0.000*** 0.3787 0.002*** 
AUT -0.1675 0.001*** -0.2534 0.013*** -0.2534 0.002*** 
INDS (not reported)       
Adjusted Rsq 0.0249  0.0240  0.0240  
Breush Pagan LM test (p-
value)  0.000  -  - 
Hausman test  
(p-value) -   0.0134  - 
VIF 1.03  -   - 
Modified Wald Test for: 
Heteroscedasticity 
(p-value) 
Serial Correlation  
(F-value) 
 
 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
  
- 
 
- 
 
The results show that both growth and declining stages have significant relationships with C_score as 
the measure for conservatism. Mature stage becomes the baseline. LCG1 (growth stage) has negative 
coefficient with C_score which means that, other things being equal, growth firms tend to have lower 
conservatism than mature firms. In other words, mature firms are more conservative than growth firms thus 
rejecting hypothesis 1. This is in contrast with Charitou et al. (2011) but consistent with Lee et al. (2006) who 
suggest that the higher the level of firms’ performance and growth, the larger the amount that earnings are 
over-reported. Although the authors use different proxy (i.e. discretionary accruals and restated amount of 
earnings) for measure of earnings management, the research findings provide valid reason for the importance 
of growth factors as part of controlling biases in earnings management measure.   
For hypothesis 2, the coefficient for LCG5 (decline stage) shows that, other things being equal, 
declining firms are more conservative than mature firms when it scores a positive coefficient. This finding 
fails to reject hypothesis 2. This is consistent with Charitou et al. (2011) who state that distressed firms have 
higher timeliness to good news but less timeliness to bad news as they need to show positive earnings for 
survival reasons. The significance of Volatility, Audit Report Type and Auditor Type is in line with prior 
studies (Khan and Watts, 2009; Chi, et al., 2009; Charitou, et al., 2011).The higher the stock return volatility, 
the more conservative a firm should be as greater agency cost is observed during high uncertainty as reflected 
by the high return volatility. The audit report and auditor type are associated with the firm specific 
characterictics and they show that firms with qualified audit opinion and are being audited by Big firms are 
more conservative. The results of Investment Cycle follows mixed findings of prior literature (Chi, et 
al.,2009) and in this study, there is no evidence that length of business cycle affect conservatism level. 
In conclusion, life-cycle stages do have impacts on level of firm’s conservatism as shown by the 
results of this study. Despite the inconclusive direction of the impacts of life-cycle stages on firms’ 
conservatism level, the characteristics and conditions embedded within each life-cycle stages have been 
shown to influence managers’ reporting behaviour, in particular, the conservatism measure.As the theoretical 
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model of how conservatism is affected by life-cycle stages has not beenstrongly developed, future research is 
needed to address this issue further. In addition, the issue of whether life-cycle stage itself becomes an 
incentive for earnings managemet is also a subject for further  research.  
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